The focus of this article is on legal-economic institutions that organized earlymodern Eurasian trade. It identifies two such institutions that had divergent dispersion patterns, the corporation and the commenda. The corporation ended up as a uniquely European institution that did not migrate until the era of European colonization. The commenda that originated in Arabia migrated all the way to Western Europe and to China. The article explains their divergent dispersion based on differences in their institutional and geographical environments and on dynamic factors. It claims that institutional analysis errs when it ignores migration of institutions. It provides building blocks for the modeling of institutional migration.
Introduction
The first generation of new institutional economists took institutions as given and as exogenous, and studied their effect on the market and on economic performance. They dealt with questions such as what types of institutions allow economic growth, or what kinds of exogenously endowed institutions facilitated the rise of the West (North and Thomas, 1973; North and Weingast, 1989) . 1 In the second generation of studies, the question was how institutions developed. The initial answer was that economic change, in the form, for example, of expanding markets or new technologies, changed the incentive for creating and altering institutions (Alchian and Demsetz, 1973; Libecap, 1978) . The more advanced answer was that legal-economic institutions were not supplied submissively by the state upon demand. Scholars (e.g., Libecap, 1989; Rosenthal, 1992) began to recognize the effect of political and social factors, of pre-existing institutions and legal building blocks, of historical paths and contingencies, on the development of legal-economic institutions. Elements in the environment as a whole were seen as potentially relevant, requiring theoretical modeling and empirical investigation, to the study of the dynamic evolvement of institutions. In addition, a feedback loop was identified between the evolvement of institutions and the performance of the economy. In other words, an attempt was made to endogenize both economic and institutional factors, in order to account for changes in both.
In recent years, a comparative perspective was added. The new comparative question was why did one environment give rise to one type of institution while another gave rise to an institution of a different type? For example, why did North African merchants organize their agency relationship in multilateral and reciprocal reputation-based coalitions while the Italians relied on bilateral and single-directional agency relationships enforced by the State 1 For a survey of the development of institutional economic history and theory, see Harris (2003) . (Greif, 1994 . See also Greif, 2006b )? Why did the corporation develop in Europe and not in Islamic civilization (Kuran, 2005) ? Why was the English East India Company based on a more voluntary and democratic model while the Dutch East India Company was based on a more oligarchic and coercive model (Harris, 2008) ? Why were guilds formed in some parts of Europe but not in other (Gelderblom and Grafe, 2007) ? Why did the US give rise to dispersed ownership of public corporations while Germany developed concentrated (La-Porta et al., 1998 . See also Roe, 2006; Roe and Gordon, 2004) ? The general framework was still that institutions reciprocally shaped and were shaped by their environment. The comparison helped to isolate and identify the elements in each environment that molded its studied institution.
A crucial element that is missing from this analysis is the possibility that institutions may have been transplanted from one environment to another. If institutions can indeed migrate between environments, then the explanation for the appearance of a specific institution in a given environment may result not only from the indigenous and reciprocal interaction between the environment and the evolving institution. It may be the outcome of a different mechanism that affects the migration of institutions and their transplantation. This is a neglected aspect in the theory of the development of legal-economic institutions. 2 A main objective of this article is to call attention to this neglect. I will present in this article an example that demonstrates how our understanding of the evolvement of institutions is enriched by the study of the migration and transplantation of institutions.
The example is the distinctive use of the business corporation and the commenda partnership in early modern Eurasian trade. While the corporation was used only by Western Europeans, the commenda was used in Europe, the Middle East and throughout the Indian 3 Ocean. A comparative study of interactions between the different environments and the institutions developed endogenously in each is not sufficient for understanding the observed institutional pattern. Only an account that takes into account the migration and transplantation of institutions, and explains why the commenda migrated and the corporation did not, can provide an understanding of the institutional pattern.
I believe that a concrete contextual discussion may provide more insight than a general and abstract discussion of the migration of institutions. In order to do this, I focus in this article on the migration of legal-economic institutions that organize maritime trade. To make things even more concrete, I analyze institutions that were applied in Eurasian trade.
Merchants from at least four major civilizations -Chinese, Indian, Arab-Muslim and Western
European -were involved in the early-modern Eurasian trade. They used two main routes:
the overland caravan routes known as the Silk Road, and oceanic routes to and across the Indian Ocean. This article focuses on the oceanic trade. 4 The merchants using the oceanic routes in question shipped similar goods within the same geopolitical environments, using not very different maritime technologies. All merchants faced similar problems: uncertainty, high risk, high investment threshold, shortage of reliable collateral, asymmetric information between traveling merchants and passive investors, augmented agency problems, concern over the protection of their property rights by foreign rulers, and more.
5
In other words, the general question is how each of these civilizations confronted these problems and organized its trade. Did they use similar or different institutions for performing similar tasks? Insofar as they used similar institutions, was this because each 3 The corporation migrated worldwide in the 19 th and 20 th century, mostly through colonial transplantation of European law and through competitive market pressures in the age of globalization. But this migration of the corporation is beyond the scope of the present article. The article calls attention to the divergent expansion of the two institutions roughly between 1200 and 1700. 4 The institutional analysis of overland trade involves different sets of questions and merits a separate study. 5 For a discussion of the obstacles faced by oceanic merchants, see Harris (2005) . reached a similar institutional design independently, through dynamic interaction between a unique environment and the evolving institutions? It is possible that some of them imported and transplanted institutions that were developed in other civilizations within different environments. In so far as transplants failed to occur why were institutions that proved efficient in one civilization not imported by others?
The comparison among civilizations is more thought provoking than the comparison between political entities or regions within the same civilization because each civilization represents a radically different environment, political, social, cultural and religious, for the institutions to evolve in. It is also particularly intriguing because the migration of institutions from one civilization to another represents more of a challenge and is likely to elicit more insights than migration within the same civilization.
To focus the study we will use a working hypothesis that offers a continuum. On one end lies the simplest form of trade organization: the individual peddler. The peddler moved as a passenger on board a ship from one marketplace to the next, with a small pack of goods literally on his back. Further along the continuum is the individual merchant traveling with a larger quantity of goods and selling them to wholesalers in a destination port, and the merchant who does not travel with his goods but instead uses traveling agents or representatives in the destination port. Around the middle of the continuum are the general partnership, the commenda and the business corporation, relatively complex forms of business organization. At the far end is the state taking the role of an organizer of trade. My hypothesis is that the state is the institution most embedded in its civilization, while the individual peddler is the least embedded. 6 Thus, state-level institutions for the organization of Eurasian trade were more likely to be developed indigenously and to differ fundamentally 6 In terms of methodology, an understanding of the organization of the state and its role in maritime trade requires answers based on the conglomerate of state, society, religion, and culture. An understanding of the individual trader and the institutions he employs requires an analysis of the basic universal building blocks of trade: contract, agency, property rights, cooperation, reputation, and information.
across civilizations. They were likely to be embedded in their civilization in the sense that they were part of a conglomerate that included religion, social structure, the bureaucracy, My hypothesis leads me to select institutions that are located closer to the middle of the continuum. The more fascinating and less predictable stories are most likely to be found not at the ends of the continuum but closer to the middle. 7 In this article, I will focus on two such institutions, the corporation and the commenda. What makes them particularly insightful is their radically different fate. The corporation ended up as a uniquely European institution that was not developed independently anywhere else and was not imported by any other civilization. The English and the Dutch were the first to establish corporations, the East India 7 I do not wish to claim at this stage that the analytical framework has strong predictive capability or that the ends of the continuum do not justify a close scrutiny. I hope to study in the future other organizational forms, including the State and the peddler. Accumulation of more studies will allow us to evaluate the predictive validity of the analytical framework. Other institutions that deserve study cannot be dealt within the limited scope of the present article. The general partnership will not be discussed in the present article. It was a multilateral contract, whose partners had more symmetric status then that of the commenda, a contract that was less popular in maritime trade than in overland trade and in manufacturing.
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Ship owning partnerships, in the form known in Europe as part ownership, are also a worthy subject for research that is beyond the scope of the present article. Some of the maritime loan contracts, the sea loan, the bottomry loan and the responentia, were somewhat complex because they coupled an element of risk allocation. They will also not be dealt here.
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On a more theoretical level, the article demonstrates the important insights that a comparative cross-civilization institutional analysis can offer. It asserts the essentiality of the study of the migration of institutions between environments and civilizations to comparative institutional analysis. On a more fundamental level, it claims that accounting for the migration of institutions is essential for the study of how the environment forms legaleconomic institutions and ultimately the ways in which institutions affect economic 8 A study of the use of general partnerships in maritime trade in general and in Eurasian trade in particular is a worthy undertaking that lies beyond the scope of the present article.
9 Each of these contracts was a loan contract with ex-ante fixed return. They all involved an element of risk allocation. But the nature of the risk covered, the party to which it was allocated and the collateral, were different in each. These interesting contracts are beyond the scope of the present paper.
performance. Such an account can be satisfactory only when the theoretical and empirical tools for understanding migrations are sufficiently robust.
The article proceeds in the following way. It begins with the commenda, presenting its complex features, the debate about its origins and its migration pattern. It moves on to the corporation, discusses its origins, points to its centrality in European long-distance trade, asks whether there existed non-European institutions akin to the corporation, and explores the European characteristics that gave rise to the corporation. Finally, the article addresses the divergent dispersion of the commenda and the corporation. It does so by examining differences in the institutional environment, paying particular attention to the family and to religious institutions; differences in the geographical environment of the MediterraneanAtlantic region on one hand and the Indian Ocean region on the other; and the role of dynamic processes such as path dependency, timing and contingencies.
The commenda
The three subsections of this section survey the organizational characteristics of the commenda, its origins and its later migration. A methodological caveat is in order. The available sources on the early history of the commenda are partial and of varying sorts. In some localities they consist of juristic books or responses to practical questions. In other places, they consist of contracts or correspondence between merchants. Only rarely are the sources in the form of mercantile codes. Sometimes they are as indirect as historical and religious narratives or as problems posed to students in math books. It is rare to find in the sources a thick presentation of the characteristics of the commenda. Historians have often had to determine whether a contract or a practice constituted a commenda based on the display in the sources of only a few characteristics. The task of a comparative project is thus complicated by the fact that sources of different legal status and different levels of detail have to be compared to each other in order to determine the mere existence of similar institutions, the extent of their similarity, the timing of their appearance, and their relative importance in various civilizations.
The task of following the migration of the commenda is even more complicated. predecessor of the limited partnership, which is an asymmetric multilateral contract. 12 The commenda was an equity investment contract, specifying investments and payoffs. The investing party provided capital in the form of goods and cash that was used for the purchase of the trade goods and for travel-related costs. He was entitled to a share of the profit. The traveling party typically did not invest capital. The commenda was also a labor contract. The traveling party invested his labor. This also included expertise, information, contacts and bodily risk. The profits of the commenda were split between the two parties. A common arrangement was 75% to the investing partner and 25% to the traveling partner. But other splitting arrangements could be found, including 50% to each, or 2/3 and 1/3. The commenda was also an agency contract. The traveling party was geographically separated from the 10 Our understanding of the history of the corporation is also bounded by the available records and by analogous methodological difficulties, but not to the same extent. Its history is based on better preserved European records. Also, beyond its early history state records tend to be better preserved. The corporation did not migrate and the complications related to migration do not apply to it.
11 The most authoritative sources on the commenda, are Weber (2003) on Europe, and Udovitch (1970) on Islam. For examples of commenda contracts of several types, see Raymond and Lopez (2001) . 12 The emergence of the limited partnership out of the commenda occurred in Europe after the time covered
here. The commandite the French limited partnership was recognized by Colbert's 1673 Ordinance. The history of the transformation of the commenda into the limited partnership deserves further research.
investing party. He did not work under direct instructions and supervision. He had some discretion as specified in the contract.
The relationship created by the commenda obliged the traveling partner to make the needed effort and not to shirk. In other words, it imposed on him fiduciary duties. The commenda contract could also be viewed as one that determines control over the assets and business affairs of the joint enterprise. Internally, the traveling party would be liable towards the investing party only when he breached his agreed-upon mandate or did not act according to common merchant customs and practices.
The liability of each of the parties towards third parties was not clearly defined; as such, it had been the subject of debate among historians. A traveling party who borrowed money, bought on credit, pledged to deliver goods at a certain place, time or quality, or to buy or sell at a pre-determined price, and failed to do so, would bear responsibility toward the relevant third parties. The investing partner would not bear responsibility beyond his investment in the fund of the commenda. It has been argued that the investing party was a limited partner. However, as far as I can tell, this was not a contemporary term. The commenda contract may be conceptualized as creating a new pool of assets, a fund, separated from that of either party. 13 The commenda's pool of assets was reachable to creditors of the commenda. But the investing party's private pool of assets was not. It is not fully clear whether it was not reachable because an extra-contractual sovereign on merchant law exempted these assets from liability, because the traveling party was not empowered to commit them, because the identity of the investing party was not known to the third parties or because his assets were physically removed from them. The upshot is that the traveling party could subject the investing party to liability towards third parties only up to the sum the latter invested in the commenda. 13 This analysis is based on Hansmann et al. (2006) .
Some scholars view the commenda as an agency contract; some as an equity investment or profit sharing contract. Yet, as detailed above, the commenda was a more complex institution than one may grasp at first sight. It determined the relationship between parties on several levels, including investment, agency, managerial control, risk allocation, profit allocation, and creation of a separate pool of assets. Hence, it should be viewed as a nexus of contracts, and also as a template or standard form contract. When selecting the commenda contract the parties selected a fixed and detailed contract that contained only a few default rules that could be tailored to their needs. They selected a well developed and detailed form of business organization.
The commenda was a voluntary contractual institution, but it could not fully function outside the realm of a legal system or without the support of a learned juristic community.
14 A legal system, including third party (state, city or merchant community) enforcement was needed. Dispute resolution required more than enforcement or fact-finding. Commenda contracts could not be complete due to the complexity of the arrangements and the unpredictability of all the circumstances. A legal system was needed for ascertaining norms, specifying and applying general standards of conduct and developing more detailed rules. A good example of such a need is the requirement that the traveling party follow common merchant practices (Udovitch, 1970) . Failure to follow such practices would amount to a breach of the commenda contract. But the support of a legal system was needed in order to turn this general standard into operative rules of conduct and enforcement. The commenda could thus be expected to be reflected in codes, particularly merchant and maritime codes, in scholarly legal books, in dispute resolution records and in practical manuals. The commenda had several variations. A basic variant according to Raymond and Lopez (2001) was one in which the traveling party also invested money, typically a third of the investment. This affected the splitting of profits. In a second variant, the traveling party could, if not prohibited, create a second commenda in which he placed all or part of the goods in the hands of a third person who traveled to a more distant market. The traveling party of the first commenda became the investing party of the second. Another variation was that the commenda assets could be not only distinct goods but also a share in a pool of goods or in a ship. The bilateral commenda could appear as part of a complex multilateral system. For example, a single traveling party could pool together goods from numerous investing parties into a commenda. This would allow him, and them, the benefits of economy of scale. 15 Conversely, an investing party could split his investment among several traveling parties.
Commenda Partnership
This would serve as a method of risk spreading. 16 To sum up, the commenda was a complex institution. In modern terms, we can call it a nexus of contracts. It combined several issues within a single legal-economic institution.
The single commenda contract was not only a nexus of several contracts, it was itself part of a complex web of contracts. Each of the parties to that contract could, and often was, a party to other commenda contracts.
The debate about the origins of the commenda
Late-nineteenth century European historians such as Weber (2003) 
Migration of the commenda across civilizations
From its origins in the Arab peninsula the commenda traveled both west and east. It traveled with the rapidly expanding Islam to Iraq and Syria, to Palestine and Egypt and to the 18 Initially the first two terms were used in the Arab peninsula and the third in Iraq but eventually all three became interchangeable.
19 I will use throughout this article the more familiar term "commenda" when referring to this institution in all civilizations, localities and periods, including the Arab-Muslim. 20 They refer to The Beauties of Commerce by Abu al-Fadl Jafar ibn Ali. There is a controversy over the dating of the book. Udovitch, following Ritter, dates it to the 11 th century. See Raymond and Lopez (2001) , Udovitch (1970) .
Maghreb. The earliest commenda contracts in Christian Europe are found in Venice and
Genoa in the late 11 th and the 12 th centuries (Raymond and Lopez ,2001; Lane, 1973) . There is no clear evidence in the literature for the exact timing, routes and agents of the importation of the commenda to Italy. But today there is little debate about the Muslim origins of
European commenda (Cizakca 1996 (Cizakca , 2006 . Commenda contracts were first used by Italians on trade routes to the Eastern Mediterranean around the time of the first and second Crusades, which suggests that this was the link. 21 The travel of the commenda further west, to Spain, and north, to Germany, is well documented. There is some controversy over whether the commenda reached England. Legal historians, for instance Postan (1973a) , argue that it contradicted basic concepts of the common law and even customary law, and that the common law developed substitutes for this institution. Some English historians, notably Postan (1973b) , Holdsworth (1922) , Plucknett (1929) and Rogers (1995) argue that even tough the English did not use a distinct name for the commenda, they in fact used and recognized contracts similar in content to those of the commenda by the late 13 th century.
Some 14 th and 15 th century yearbook cases indeed refer to transactions between parties that have profit sharing elements in them. It is likely that these were commenda contracts because at least one of them was between Italian merchants who often used this type of contract, because of the asymmetry in the inputs of the parties -one providing only capital and one only labor, and because they were identified as such by notable historians. Yet these transactions were litigated within the framework of the writ of account that gave rise only to disputes between partners, not to disputes between partners and third parties. As a result, it is 21 There is a considerable evidence for the importation of Arab business institutions to Europe. See Lieber (1968); . It is possible that the commenda was imported also through Spain or Sicily. For the purposes of this article it is not necessary to reach a conculsion.
not possible to clearly determine whether these transactions involved commenda or general partnerships.
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The commenda appears frequently in the Cairo Geniza records, which contain correspondence and contracts dealing with the overseas trade of Cairo Jews. They reflect the wide use these merchants made of the Muslim commenda (qirad or mudaraba), termed in
Hebrew qirad al-goym (qirad of gentiles) as distinct from the Jewish partnership (qirad betorat isqa). Goitein, the leading historian of the Geniza, concludes that the Muslim commenda was in much more frequent use in the maritime trade of these Jewish merchants than the Jewish partnership. The earliest appearances of the commenda in the Geniza are from the first decades of the 11 th century. They can be found in some of the oldest documents that were preserved. This is supportive evidence for the claim that the origins of the commenda are Muslim. The commenda was used in contracts with both Jewish and Muslim partners. Disputes were resolved according to the relevant Muslim law (Goitein, 1967) . This serves as an additional support for my argument that the commenda was not a simple contract but rather a complex institution requiring the support of a legal system for both enforcement and creating detailed governing rules.
Though the Geniza relates primarily to Mediterranean trade, it provides evidence also on trading with India, usually via Aden. The commenda was a common form of contract in the India trade of Jewish merchants based in Cairo. 23 The Geniza records are thus relevant not only to the origins of the commenda but also to its migration and both routes and agents of migration. The Jewish traders traveling from Cairo to the Indian Ocean ports may have served as the exporter of this institution to India. 22 It is impossible to reach a conclusive assessment whether the common law recognized the limited liability of the investing partner or subjected him to a full joint and several liability towards creditors similar to the case of partners in general partnerships. 23 On the Jewish trade between Cairo and India, see Goitein (1954 Goitein ( , 1966 . See also Goitein and Friedman (2008) .
The surviving evidence for the trade of Muslim traders with India is not as complete as the Geniza records. Yet, the remaining records, such as documents found in the excavation site called the "Sheikh's house" in the Red Sea port of Quseir, indicate that the commenda was a common form. Quseir was a major transit port on the route from Fustat (old Cairo) and the Nile Valley to the Indian Ocean (Guo, 2004) . The commenda was carried eastwards with these Muslim and Jewish traders. Commenda contracts were also used by European traders when they reached Asia, using the Cape route, in the 16 th century. Portuguese merchants funded by commenda contracts sailed on board Crown ships taking the Crown routes (carreiras) to Asia (Prakash, 2006) . The commenda was also used by the first Dutch traders who arrived in the Indian Ocean shortly before 1600, and served as the basis for precompanies that initiated the first Dutch voyages to Asia.
The use of traveling agents was a common practice in Indian maritime trade. They were used on eastward routes to Basra, Aden and the like, and on western routes. The nakhuda was either a senior traveling merchant or a representative of the ship's owner. He was appointed commander of the voyage. Lesser agents were employed by other merchants and investors (Das Gupta, 2001; Das-Gupta and Pearson, 1999) . Agents were sometimes employed on fixed salary or allowed to trade privately. However, according to Das Gupta (2001) commenda contracts in which the principal and the agents split the profits and allocated the risk, were quite common. Chaudhuri (1985) also believes, based on scattered evidence, that commenda contracts were used in Indian Oceanic trade. The institution could have been copied from Arab or Jewish merchants arriving in India or imported by Muslim
Gujarati merchants trading with Persia and Arabia or making the pilgrimage to Mecca.
The migration of the commenda further east is not well documented in surviving records. The reconstruction of this migration involves significant methodological problems as discussed above. In his travel book written around 1510, Tome Pires (1990) , one of the first Portuguese to arrive in Indonesia, provided a first-hand impression of local trade practices before the disruptive arrival of the Europeans. He reported on a practice of splitting profits and risks between merchants and junk ships owners. The leading historians of the early modern Indonesian trade (see, for example, van Leur, 1955 and Meilink-Roelofsz, 1962) view this and other records as evidence of the use of the commenda in the trade between India and Indonesia, in inter-island trade, and even in trade with China. They also mention
Chinese merchants investing in commenda and foreigners using commenda in Chinese port towns. This was the last missing link in the migration of the commenda from Arabia to China.
There is also evidence of the use of commenda, or at least transactions quite similar to the commenda, in China, as early as the Song Dynasty (960-1279). Yoshinobu (1970) and So (2000) have found evidence, in 12 th and 13 th century texts, of investment in shipping both for fixed interest and for a share of the profits. 24 The latter contractual form is akin to commenda.
Eventually, this complex institutional form, which was designed specifically for longdistance trade, was used by investors and their agents from the northwestern edge of Europe to the easternmost parts of Asia. As such, it became a common characteristic of many of the circuits and links of Eurasian trade.
The corporation
As will be shown below, the conception of the corporation as a separate legal entity is uniquely European. In order to substantiate this observation and explain it, a working definition of the corporation has to be offered. A corporation is an association of individuals that has a legal entity distinct from those of these individuals. It has the capacity to own property separately from that of its individual members. It can contract with third parties in its corporate capacity. A corporation can regulate its internal affairs, discipline its members and resolve their disputes. A corporation has a hierarchical and centralized governance structure, through which regulations and decisions are made and agents are empowered. By the 13 th and 14 th centuries, the legal concept of the corporation was well defined in the high legal texts of the revived Roman law and of Canon law. The corporation was used in a variety of contexts, including church entities, universities and colleges, municipalities and guilds. By the 16 th century a few other features were added to that conception. Its purposes were made sufficiently flexible to be used for business and profit purposes. It raised capital for the purpose of conducting business. Entry and exit to membership in the corporation could be voluntarily and based on a payment. As a conception that embodies all these features, even
those that were present as early as the 14 th century, the corporation is a unique European conception.
The debate about the origins of the corporation
A long-standing debate surrounds the early history of the corporation. I identify four different approaches in the historiography of the corporation. The first, which views the corporation as a Roman jurists' invention, was advanced by law scholars and historians of Roman law, such as Duff (1971 Specifically, they responded to their changing environment, in which associations such as independent cities, universities and guilds, were gaining importance. These associations needed an institutional platform for owning property, setting governance structures, resolving disputes and the like, that the corporation provided.
The third considers the corporation a Church and canonic law invention. Berman shared by three of the approaches, leads to the conclusion that the corporation became available only three or four centuries after the commenda. I shall return to this point when discussing dynamic explanations. The second issue at stake is whether we can learn anything from the environment that gave rise to the European corporation regarding the uniqueness of that environment and the possibility that in other civilizations, a similar environment existed and could indigenously give rise to similar institutions. I shall return to this issue when discussing the institutional environment as an explanation for the divergence in dispersion.
Did there exist non-European corporations?
So far, I have assumed that the corporate conception was uniquely European. In principle this assumption could be based on a methodological bias nested in a Eurocentric perspective. Instead of looking for migration, would it not make sense to look for indigenous growth? Other civilizations could have given rise to institutions that used different terms and that configured their corporate-like features differently than the European corporation. I will first deal with the Islamic waqf, then with the Chinese family lineage organization and finally with the Hindu sreni. In doing so, I will not ask whether these institutions substituted for the corporation by performing similar functions. Leaving the question of substitutes until later, I
will ask whether any of them was, in fact, a corporation in disguise.
3.2.1The Islamic waqf
As a legal entity detached from individual human beings, the corporation was not recognized in Islamic legal texts. Nor was it used in Arab civilization. It is argued that the waqf was the Islamic institution that served as a substitute for the corporation. Waqf is often translated as charitable trust. Indeed it has similarities to the English trust. 25 The waqf was a created by a person who endowed land or other immovable property for the advancement of a public or a family purpose. The purpose had to be considered charitable or pious. The property given to the waqf was inalienable. The waqf's purpose was advanced by enjoyment of the property itself or of the income generated by utilization of the property. A trustee (mutawalli) was appointed by the founder, or according to the founder's instructions, to oversee the waqf's property, implement the purpose of the waqf and make sure that the waqf's beneficiaries would get their share of the usufruct. The local judge (qadi) served as a general supervisor of all awqāf (plural of waqf) within his jurisdiction (Schacht, 1983) . What was the legal status of the waqf's property? The beneficiaries were not the owners of the property.
The trustee held in trust but did not own it. The common interpretation in the Hanafi School of Islamic law was that the property was not owned by anyone as long as it remained waqf property. A non-orthodox modern interpretation argues that because the property was owned by the waqf the waqf should be viewed in retrospect as a corporate entity (Zahraa, 1995) . Yet the common view is and was that the waqf, like the English trust, and unlike the European corporation, was unincorporated.
Though the waqf did not embody all the features of the corporation, the two shared features. The waqf allowed the holding of a separate pool of assets. This feature implied both 25 For the supposition that the English trust originated from the waqf, see Gaudiosi (1988) ; Avini (1996) . perpetual holding of property and a degree of entity shielding from creditors of the beneficiaries. It enabled the separation of ownership from control and the employment of agents. However, it did not constitute a property-owning institution in a fuller sense. It did not provide governance or decision-making bodies. Its activities, unlike those of a corporation, were constrained by the "dead hand" of its creator. There were practical ways to circumvent the creator's instruction but the legality of these practices was questionable. The bottom line was that the waqf did not provide a full substitute for the corporation (Kuran, 2001 ).
The Chinese family lineage organization
The Chinese kinship organization, sometimes called the clan Corporation, is considered by Ruskola (2000) and other scholars as the Chinese equivalent of the European business corporation. The kinship organization is based on lineage, a fundamental element of Chinese society, and to understand it, we need to survey the attributes of lineage.
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Individuals on the same genealogical patrilineal line, who maintained significant social relationships, were considered members of the same lineage. The lineage was the highest social organization short of the state. Members of the same lineage usually lived near each other, in the same community, village or set of villages. The core bond of a lineage, however, was religious. All members of the lineage, and only members of the lineage, worshipped the same ancestors. Often the common ancestral roots went back many generations. Ancestral worship took place on lower levels as well, the family, the branch and the sub-linage.
However, the lineage level worship was the most important, because it represented the widest circle connected to the same ancient ancestor. The worship ceremony involved gathering in ancestral halls, making sacrifices, and other rituals. 
The Indian sreni
The sreni organized craftsmen and merchants in the Indian subcontinent. It was an association of persons rather than capital or property. Each sreni organized an identified branch in a defined locality. Some scholars date the sreni, which appears in ancient Hindu texts, back to 800 BCE or even earlier. In these texts, several corporate features are identified in the sreni, a central feature being the power to regulate its members. The sreni issued rules of conduct, judged and disciplined its members, and litigated disputes among them. Rules were promulgated in sreni assemblies. Membership in the sreni was hereditary. The sreni held property for performing its main functions and could be a party to transaction in assets (e.g., Majumdar, 1918; Khanna, 2005) . There is some evidence that the sreni lent money to their members and performed charitable services. The sreni was similar in some respects to the European guild. Recently, Khanna claimed that the sreni was in fact a predecessor of the business corporation, but there is no evidence that they were actually used for the same range of functions as the corporation. We know that they were not used as profit-maximizing enterprises or in maritime trade. From the texts, it can be inferred that the sreni had some of the organizational features of the corporation but not others. They developed indigenously in India long before the development of guild or of the corporation in Europe. They were not imported by any other neighboring civilization, and declined before the arrival of Europeans and their corporations in India.
In sum, institutions outside Europe, the Islamic waqf, the Chinese family lineage and the Indian sreni had some, but not all or even most, of the features contained in the concept of the corporation in its early stages and none of the features added to it by the 16 th century. decisions on a rational, profit maximizing, capitalist basis. In the same vein, North (1990) views the corporation as a key institution in the rise of the West because it economized on 27 For the early development of English regulated and joint stock trading corporations see Harris (2000) 28 For the formation of the English and Dutch companies see Harris (2005 Harris ( , 2008 29 The Cape Route was used in our period exclusively by Europeans. In the years 1495-1595 the route was used exclusively by Portuguese who did not use the corporate form but rather State organization. From 1600 most of the ships using the Cape route were operated by corporations. About 80% of the 10,000 ships that used the Cape route between 1600 -1795 on their way from Europe to Asia were employed by the English and Dutch East India Companies alone. See de Vries (2003) transaction costs and spread risks. For their part, Carlos and Nicholas (1988) view it as an efficient merger of the various links in the chain that connected East Asian producers with European consumers.
The centrality of the corporation in the long

The divergent dispersion of the commenda and the corporation
One has to address two sets of issues in order to explain the divergent dispersion of the commenda and the corporation. The first is why the corporation developed endogenously where it did. The more singular the European circumstances were, the less likely the corporation was to evolve indigenously elsewhere. The second is why the commenda migrated widely whereas the corporation did not migrate beyond its place of origin. An explanation cannot always separate the two sets of issues. 30 I will begin by discussing differences in the institutional environment, from the state, to institutions of higher learning, to the family, and finally to religious institutions. These differences can explain both why the corporation developed in Europe and why other civilizations neither needed it nor imported it. I will move on to geographical differences between the places of origin of the two institutions. The more central place of origin of the commenda and the openness of the Indian Ocean can partly explain the spread of the commenda. Finally, I will show how historical dynamics, such as timing, path dependency and contingencies also influenced the divergent outcome. The purpose of the next three sub-sections is to demonstrate plausible explanations, suggest a constructive research agenda and offer building blocks for more formal models of institutional migration. 30 Two other questions will not be addressed here because they are not crucial to the question at hand. The first is why the commenda evolved in Arabia and not elsewhere? A definitive answer would be difficult due to the scarcity of sources about its origins. In any case, I do not make a strong claim against the possible indigenous and independent emergence of the commenda in other places and civilizations. The second is why the corporation migrated beyond Europe in the last two centuries? The dominance of Europe, its political empires and its economies in this period created a new environment that lies beyond the timeframe and conceptual scope of the current article.
The Institutional Environment
A first intuitive response to the question of why the corporation did not migrate out of Europe is that it is strongly linked to the European state. This is in line with the initial hypothesis generated by the framework used to shape this project. Recall that along our constructed continuum the corporation was placed closer to the state. civilizations as well without resort to the corporation, in institutions such as the waqf, the family lineage and the sreni. By the same token, limited liability on the other hand was not highly relevant for the early long-distance trading corporations for the same reasons it was not relevant to the commenda. The most significant reason was that investors back home were unlikely to be exposed to debt liability incurred overseas.
Let us turn now to the second sub-issue: why non-European states did not indigenously develop corporation-like institutions? What was singular in the European states that gave rise to the corporation? Preliminary explanations can be the more fierce competitions among the numerous states in Europe, the federal structure of some European states, the uniqueness of the relationship between State and Church in Europe, the distinctive European conception of sovereignty and the relative autonomy of the European city. These are all tentative and preliminary factors that require further research.
The third sub-issue involves the divergent migration patterns. It can be argued that the corporation could only migrate "from above" with state support while the commenda could migrate also "from below" by merchants adopting contractual practices. Since the corporation migrated quite freely between various states within Europe one wonders why the migration stopped at the borders of Christian Europe. The commenda on the other hand, as I argued above, was not a mere contractual form that could easily be learned and copied. It needed a supportive legal system and this could not be transferred by the practicing merchants themselves. Some level of migration "from above", at the level of juristic scholarship, of merchant code compilation, or even of state court litigation was needed. While I find the relationship to the state as having some value, and as providing some justification for the analytical framework offered in the introduction, I aim at examining additional explanations for the migration pattern.
The view that the corporation is an offspring of the Church is the most plausible in my view and most uniquely European. There were no parallels to the Roman Catholic Church in terms of the monolithic and hierarchical structure of its organization. 31 Insofar as the Church was the main factor that led to the development of the corporation, as Berman claims, we would not expect the corporation to develop independently and indigenously elsewhere. This
Church-based explanation can be complemented by the explanation that connects the development of the corporation to the existence in Europe of independent cities, self-governing merchant and trade guilds, and autonomous academic establishments, none of which existent in other civilizations.
A new explanation for the appearance of corporations specifically in Europe, which goes beyond the state, was recently suggested by Greif (2006a) . Western Europe was singular in not having a social structure based on the extended family. A combination of demographic and religious factors led to the scattering of extended families in Europe and to the rise of the nuclear family as a core unit in society. Increased fertility in the 9th and 10th centuries led to an increase in the number of children per family and increased the size of extended families up to a point at which joint habitation became impossible. The Christian Church, for both theological and demographical reasons, prohibited polygamy, discouraged endogamic marriages up to four and at some point even seven degrees of kindred and made incest a sin and a crime, making the exogamic family the norm (Fossier, 1996) . This splitting up of the extended family into nuclear families created an institutional vacuum that may have fueled the rise of non-family institutions designed to promote cooperation and collective action.
What other civilizations managed through extended families, lineages, clans, social networks and other informal institutions, in the relatively impersonal European society had to achieve formally and through law.
Greif's explanation also complements Kuran's (2005) explanation that the extended family of the Middle East was an institution that provided wealth, security and permanence.
Similarly, the Chinese extended family organized along multi-generation lineage lines performed many social, economic, political and religious functions that could not be performed by the European nuclear family.
The Europeans developed the corporation, then, not because they enjoyed an advantage in institutional design capability but, rather, because they needed substitute for what was missing in their society -the extended family. The reliance of other civilizations on the family as a platform for business served them well in the short run. However, in the longer run it inhibited them from developing impersonal institutions such as the corporation.
This explanation is not free of criticism. Certain historians of the family hold that the nuclear-extended distinction is too reductive for the complexity of familial relationships. One should focus not only on the number of children and on cohabitation, they say, but also on emotions, dependence and trust. It can further be argued that in banking and long-distance trade even in Europe families played an important role. The family rather than the corporation was the organizational platform of the giant Medici and the Fugger enterprises.
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It is clear, then, that the structure of the European family cannot explain fully the rise of the corporation in Europe. Nevertheless, I do wish to suggest a further inquiry along this line.
Since the nuclear European family is said to be the outgrowth of Christianity, and specifically of its marriage and inheritance laws, Greif's and Berman's explanations overlap.
While for Berman, the institutional structure of the Papacy and the Church made all the difference; for Greif, it is the theological and normative family rules that mattered. But these rules, in turn, were influenced by the institutional interests of the Church.
Was the commenda connected in a similar way to the institutional environment in which it evolved? The view adopted above is that the commenda originated in pre-Islamic Arabia, among the merchants of Mecca and other towns and oases that were involved in longdistance trade. It evolved from below, in trade practices, possibly borrowing from earlier Jewish or Byzantine practices. It did not have religious origins. We should not be confused by the fact that historians trace the first references to it to the Quran and to early Muslim law books. These are the earliest references probably because its earlier history was mostly oral 32 It is worth mentioning that family firms, such as the Fuggers and the Welsers, did not operate independently when it came to long-distance Asian trade. They cooperated with the Portuguese state apparatus, the estado da ´India. By the late 16 th century these family firms, which were organized based on the general partnership model, lost ground to Dutch pre-companies based on the commenda model and in the early 17 th century to the Dutch and English East India Companies. and left no traces in written documents. The context of the discussion of the rules governing the commenda is in the more secular parts of Islamic law. Because of these origins, the commenda could more easily be detached from its environment, transferred, and transplanted into other religious, social and political environments where it performed similar longdistance trade functions.
Geographical explanations
The travel distance of ideas and institutions that were developed in a civilization closer to the center of the Eurasian land mass was shorter than that of ideas and institutions developed on its western edge. The place of origin of the commenda was closer to the Indian Ocean than that of the corporation. It was more central to the main business routes going east.
It happened to emerge in a place and time that enabled it to be carried first westward and then eastward with Muslim religion, conquest and trade. It migrated to south and east Asia with the general flow of Islamic ideas, technologies and institutions.
Interaction between civilizations does not take place only on frontiers and through conquests. 33 The Indian Ocean is a prime example of interaction and diffusion in multiple sites and forms. Arab merchants probably visited Indonesia before the arrival of Islam. They definitely visited China by the 8 th century (Hourani, 1951; Richards, 1970) . Chinese merchants traveled to Indonesia and India in Song times, if not before, and in the early 15 th century, with the fleets of the eunuch admiral Zheng He, also to Arabia (Deng, 1999; JungPang, 1955; Levathes, 1994 and Fitzgerald, 1972) . Networks of merchants, with overseas branches and agents, spread over the major entrepots of the Indian Ocean (Abu-Lughod, 1989; Chaudhuri, 1985) . The geography of the Indian Ocean and the streams and monsoon regime made the straits of Malacca an essential passage between the South China Sea and the Bay of Bengal and beyond. Malacca became a meeting place for Chinese, Indian and Arabian 33 For the methodological and theoretical approaches, see Trivellato (2002) .
merchants, and, from the 16 th century, also for European merchants. Ships often harbored in Malacca for several months, awaiting the shift in the monsoon regime (see Meilink-Roelofsz, 1962; Pires, 1990 and van Leur 1955) . Malacca was the ultimate Indian Ocean cosmopolitan entrepot. The dominant legal view around the Indian Ocean, unlike in Europe and the Atlantic Ocean, was that of a free ocean and freedom of access to ports (Alexandrowicz, 1967) . These cosmopolitan encounters were one of the triggers for the passage of individuals from one civilization to another as interpreters, navigators, agents and the like. Ships with crews from a mixture of civilizations were not uncommon in the Indian Ocean. Europeans were outsiders, or very late arrivals, to these sites of commercial, cultural, technological and institutional exchanges. While the conception of the commenda floated around the Indian
Ocean since the 8 th or 10 th centuries, the conception of the corporation did not. To reach Indonesia or China, it had to be taken along overland routes, through other civilizations.
Institutional dynamics
In the first subsection of the present section we discussed institutional substitute, the family, and institutional demands, the Church, in a static setting. Here I will add the dynamic element. I will focus on two examples that expose two types of dynamics. The first come from Islamic civilization and deals with the development of the waqf. The second example comes from China and deals with the development of the family lineage organization. In
Islam the institution that was adopted and adapted for semi-public functions could not be adapted as did the European corporation for business purposes. In China the institution that was adopted was in the process of adaptation for business functions and could potentially become quite similar to the corporation in its features. But its development was blocked exogenously. Timing, path dependencies and contingencies play an important role in analyzing the two types of dynamics.
The spread of the waqf as a substitute for the semi-public corporation
The waqf appeared in the middle of the 8 th century and increasingly came into use in the 9 th to 12 th centuries for semi-public purposes such as the building and running of mosques, hospitals, caravansaries (roadside inns), among these other social and charitable services (Kuran, 2001) . It was used not only by Arabs but also by Iranians, Turks, Slavic
Muslims and even non-Muslim minorities. It is clear that the Arabs or other Muslims did not use it to organize their Eurasian trade. This is a path dependency explanation: because the waqf was introduced first, it was adopted for semi-public purposes. Because of this the demand for importing the corporation for semi-public purposes never emerged. By using the waqf for semi-public purposes they did not have to encounter the absence of the corporation at that stage. Although demand for a new institution for business and trade purposes did appear at a later stage, the people of the Middle East that were already locked-in the waqf path.
It is interesting to note that the waqf did not substitute for the corporation in two important semi-public functions performed by corporations in Europe. Municipalities and universities were not organized and governed by the institution of the waqf. Historians of the Muslim madrasa and of cities in the Arab Middle East (e.g. Stern, 1970; Johansen, 1981; Raymond, 1994; Makdisi, 1970 and Arjomand, 1999) recognize that one of the main differences between these and their European counterparts is that the latter were organized based on the corporation model while the former were less formal, their governance less structured, and their legal status more ambiguous. This observation has several implications.
First of all, it supports the above argument that the waqf was not a corporation bearing other name. It suggests that the waqf had features and history that prevented it from being adapted to employment in municipalities and madrasas. Second, it challenges the conclusion that the corporation did not develop in the Arab-Muslim civilization because the waqf fully supplied the institutional demand in the semi-public sphere. Finally, it stresses the consequences of the non-migration of the corporation.
The waqf partly responded to the demand for some semi-public functions. But what about demands from merchants? Kuran (2005) has discussed the reasons for the absence of corporations in Islamic law. To the effect of the waqf, he adds the effect of family structure.
The communal and family-oriented vision of early Islam disfavored the introduction of larger and more formal social and organizational forms. Larger impersonal entities could end in factionalism of the kind that is unlikely to emerge in family-and tribe-based entities. Also, demand for an institution that would serve large-scale business enterprises did not develop because inheritance and partnership law splintered business entities in the Islamic Middle
East into small economic and social fragments. Atomistic enterprises were unable to act collectively to make political and legal elites introduce corporate forms of organization.
The absence of the corporation limited the organizational choices for Middle Eastern trade either to the commenda, or to partnerships, agents, traveling peddlers and the like. It will not be correct to assert, because the waqf was available before the corporation, that in the Middle East it met demand that was later met in Europe by the corporation. Some needs were satisfied by the waqf, some by the extended family and some by the commenda. Yet some, including the organization of long-distance maritime trade on a long-term basis, remained 
The transformation of the family lineage organization into a business corporation
Over time the holding of ancestral property by the Chinese family lineage over time led to the adaptation of the lineage organization also to economic purposes. In the economic context, it was first used in support of agriculture and domestic manufacturing. The institution of the family lineage was used to promote cooperation, pool assets, spread risks, split profits and discard non-productive family members. Zhenman (2001) indicates that these objectives were achieved by a combination of lineage shaping strategies, including marriage alliances, adoption, family naming, the invention of common ancestors, the disjointing of a branch from a lineage and the conferring of property to the lineage ancestral estate. Wealthier lineages that held more common property gradually became active in manufacturing or trade, using the lineage's institutional structure for the organization of their business enterprises.
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Business-related property was owned by the lineage. The lineage allowed, it is argued, not only the owning of common property, but also the formation of concentrated management, the appointment of agents and the division of profits.
Zhenman (2001) argues that by the Ming era, some of the richer and more active lineages were transformed into what he terms "contractual lineages." These lineages were based on common interests rather than on agnatic links. They actively used all the above strategies. Thus they allowed more flexibility in deviation from traditional lineage traditions.
They were based on providing the investment in return for a share in the profits and control.
Such shares experienced commoditization, and eventually they could be bought and sold. By 34 A forthright statement of the role of lineage, the "patricorporation," in the rise of petty capitalism in China can be found in Gates (1996) .
Qing times, the organization of share-based lineages, and their trust property, had become sufficiently sophisticated to allow their use in large-scale business enterprises, such as the Zigong salt industry (Zelin, 2004 , see also Ruskola, 2000 and Zelin, 1988 To conclude, I have offered an analysis of two distinct processes of institutional dynamics. In Arab-Islamic civilization the demand for public and semi-public functions was supplied by the waqf. The early adoption of the waqf for semi-public purposes yielded high returns in the short run. But on the longer run that adoption led to a lock-in on an institutional path that limited the development of business organization. In China the family lineage organization gradually evolved into an institution that can function for business functions.
But intervention from the outside, by the Europeans and their corporations, before the completion of the process, blocked further evolution. The institution that was adopted gradually evolved to meet the new functions. China was not locked in to a dead-end path. But along the path exogenous shocks blocked the institutional transformation of an institution that was flexible enough to develop further on its own.
Timing
Timing is crucial in dynamic processes and in institutional development. According to most accounts, the commenda had earlier historical routes than the corporation. It appeared before the rise of Islam. Thus, its lack of tight connection to Islam facilitated its migration outside of Muslim-governed territories. It was available when Islam expanded rapidly and could migrate with it. It was used in a relatively advanced form by the 8 th century, if not before, while the corporation only appeared no earlier than the 12 th century. The commenda had an early start. It had four more centuries in which to migrate. It was formed in a unique conjuncture which enhanced its migration.
The waqf also had an early start compared to the corporation. As a result, by the time that the corporation emerged in Europe and became available for importation to Arab-Islamic civilization, much of the institutional demand by semi-public organizations was already supplied by the waqf.
The corporation was also designed in unique timing and conjuncture of circumstances. The dismantling of the extended family and the appearance of the nuclear family at the beginning of the second millennium were important factors in increasing European demand for the corporation. Another component of the contingency consisted of struggles between secular states and the Pope, which created new institutional needs of the Church at about the same time.
At the other end of the timeline, it was very late before the corporation proved to be an advantageous institution for the organization of Eurasian trade. Only several decades after the establishment of the EIC in 1600 and of the VOC in 1602, did the long-term economic performance of the corporate form, in its joint-stock variation, become evident. Earlier applications of the corporate form, which were domestic in nature, did not interact with Asian civilizations. As such, they did not present themselves as relevant to the activities of Indian Ocean merchants. By the 17 th century, Asian civilizations had less time and more obstacles to adopt the corporate form.
Conclusion
This article has focused its historical research in several stages. It began with legaleconomic institutions perceived to have significant effects on economic performance:
institutions for the organization of long-distance trade. It recognized that such institutions evolved in different forms in different environments. Thus, it was shaped as a comparative project that examined the institutions of four major civilizations: Western European, ArabMuslim, Indian and Chinese. Such a comparison across civilizations is likely to generate interesting insights because of the radically different religious, social and political environments.
We have focused on the performance of similar functions, namely the organization of long-distance maritime Eurasian trade, conducted mostly in the Indian Ocean. In the period under consideration, roughly the early modern era, all four civilizations were involved in that trade. These temporal and functional foci have turned the project from one that compares institutions in the abstract to one that compares them in a very specific context. Of the various institutions involved in Eurasian trade, ranging from the state to the peddler, the project has pinpointed two institutions, the corporation and the commenda. The two were selected because they are located around the center of the proposed continuum for predicting of the likelihood of institutions to migrate. This enabled the article to focus on a conjuncture in which both the migration of institutions and their indigenous evolution are likely and should be examined.
The article has noted that the commenda migrated from Arabia all the way to northwestern Europe and to China. In sharp contrast, only the western Europeans used the would make it suitable for use for business purposes so was the Chinese lineage organization. 35 The Chinese family lineage organization went through constant adaptations.
It was not an obsolete institution when the Europeans arrived in Asia. It may well have been further adapted for business purposes or even for maritime trade. But unlike the English trust, which was defeated by the corporation within the same state and legal system, the family lineage lost ground to outsiders and its further adaptation was repressed.
The commenda was widely used in Eurasian maritime trade around 1600, prior to the arrival of the English and Dutch East India Companies. Thereafter, the corporation rose to dominance, first in the Levant and Russia trade, then Cape-route trade between Europe and Asia, and gradually also in intra-Asian trade. Eventually, corporation-based economies 35 On the triumph of the corporation over the trust, see Harris (2000) .
became global leaders. One of the key differences between the two institutions is that while the commenda was basically a single-venture contract, the corporation was a lasting institution that allowed the accumulation of capital over time and even intergenerational transfer of locked-in capital. The correlation between the diffusion patterns of these institutions and the later economic performance of the civilizations that used them speaks volumes.
